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I INTRODUCTION 
The Employment Relations Act 2000 (the ER Act) induced a wave of publicity 
suITounding the introduction of "good faith bargaining" into New Zealand's employment 
lav.. Following numerou public submissions both for and against the obligation, the 
provisions survived, albeit in an amended form. However, as the ER Act approaches its 
first anniversary, there is little progress forward on what this good faith creature entails. 
Questions remain unanswered as to what bad faith claims may consist of and also what 
form they will take. 
Many areas have been identified where good faith is likely to penetrate. This 
paper addresses two aspects of collective bargaining which have proven contentious 
abroad. The first, surface bargaining, is not generally argued as a breach of a particular 
provision, yet rather good faith as a whole. This will be examined in contrast with the 
second, impermissible communication, which may be observable within surface 
bargaining, but also stands as an independent breach. To determine where the line of 
good faith will be drawn in New Zealand, this paper will identify the specific paths 
followed by the United States and Canada, and the relevant factual backgrounds. The 
connections between the North American good faith obligations, New Zealand's labour 
law history and the ER Act provisions will be analysed, with the intent of finding 
indicative good faith guidelines. 
II NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT 
A The Context Surrounding Enactment of the ER Act 
The publicity attracted by the ER Act is largely attributable to the starkly different 
nature from its predecessor, the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (the EC Act.) The 
object of the EC Act was to "promote an efficient labour market," 1 achieved through an 
Act based on a contractual approach to employment. Consequent interpretations formed 
what has been desc1ibed as a "minimalist bargaining regime," with employers reaping the 
benefits.2 A marked increase in individual employment contracts, at the expense of 
1 
Employment Contracts Act I 991, long title. 
2 John Hughes "The Collecti ve Bargaining Code of Good Faith" (2001 ) 26(1 ) NZJIR 59, 62. 
collective employment contracts and unionisation, was observed as a major feature. 3 In 
contrast, the ER Act ' s object is to bui ld productive employment relationships , to be 
achieved through measures such as promoting collective bargaining, mediation , the 
observance of core International Labour Organi sation Conventions4 and the use of good 
faith. 5 These contrasting objectives highlight the different directions of the two Acts , 
particularly the move from an individualist to collective scheme. A major component of 
thi s move is the significant ro le the characteri sation of employment as a relationship 
enj oys in the ER Act. 6 
Where the EC Act did not mention the words 'trade union' , the ER Act offers 
increased recognition , support and rights for unions,7 and actively encourages collective 
bargaining. However, the ER Act does not represent a complete overhaul of the EC Act, 
as it maintains the same "direct, contractual , not overly forma!"8 bargaining approach , 
with many sections, such as freedom of associ ation and personal grievance provi sions, 
can-ied forward from the EC Act. 9 The ER Act then builds on these elements with new 
concepts , particularly good faith , in an attempt to build relationships and address the 
inherent bargaining inequality. The recognition of medi ation as "the primary problem-
solving mechanism," 10 reinforces thi s, encouraging parti es to come to their own answers 
3 See Margaret Wil son "The E mployme nt Re lati ons Act : A Statu tory Fra mework fo r Ba lance in the 
Workpl ace" (2001 ) 26( 1) ZJIR 5, 6. 
4 
Sec ti o n 3(b) pro motes observance of' the Internatio na l Labour Orga nisation (ILO) Conve ntio n 87 o n 
Freedo m of Assoc iati o n a nd Conventio n 98 on the R ight to Organi se and Barga in Co ll ec ti vely. ew 
Zea land has no t ratifi ed these Conventions, but have an ob li gation ris ing fro m ILO me mbership to respect, 
promote and rea li se these princ iples. During the EC Act the Freedo m of Assoc iati o n Committee of the ILO 
inves ti gated New Zealand ' s co mpli ance, and fo und that the EC Act did not adequate ly address these 
conve ntio ns, (despite a Final dec isio n which was far less criti ca l than the Interim .) See Go rdo n Anderson 
"Coll ecti ve Barga ining and the Law: New Zeal and 's E mployme nt Contrac ts Act F ive Yea rs On" ( 1996) 9 
AJLL 103. 
5 
Employment Re lati o ns Ac t 2000, s 3. 
6 
See ge nerall y Robyn M ac kay (ed) E111p /oy111e11t Law Guide (5 ed, Butterworths, W e llingto n) 11 - 13, 26-27. 
7 
A unio n is the o nl y leg itimate body of e mployees who can negotiate a co ll ec ti ve agreeme nt with 
employers, see s5 inte rpretatio n o f ·collecti ve agreeme nt. ' T hi s recognitio n is supported with wider access 
ri ghts, parti cul arl y fo r the purposes of rec ruitment, compare E mployme nt Re lati o ns Act 2000, s 20, with 
Employment Contracts Act, s 13. 
8 
Peter Boxa ll "Eva luating Continuity and Change in the E mployment Re lati ons Act 2000" (2001 ) 26( 1) 
NZJIR 27, 28. 
9 
Compare Emplo yment Re lati ons Act 2000, ss 8, 9, 11 with and E mployment Co ntracts Act 199 1, ss 6, 7, 
8, and al so E mployme nt Rel ati o ns Act 2000, s l 03 with E mploy ment Contracts Act 1991 , s 27 
respecu ve ly. However the new personal gri evance sectio n is supple me nted with the additi o n o r 
re instateme nt as the primary re medy, Employ ment Re lat io ns Act 2000, 125. 
10 
E mployment Relati o ns Act 2000, s 3(a)(v). 
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at an early stage. A specialist investigatory body, the Employment Relations Authority 
(the Authority) , 11 follows mediation, and is the first step in a judicial process which the 
ER Act aspires will play only a minimal role in employment relationships. 12 
B The ER Act's Good Faith Provisions 
I Section 4 and Section 32 
The ER Act emphasises the important foundation which mutual trust and 
confidence 13 and good faith will provide in these relationships. As these values have not 
previously been in ew Zealand's statutory employment law, i.i their interpretation and 
implementation will be instrumental to any ER Act reforms. In order to achieve the object 
of good faith, both general and specific measures have been engaged. Section 4 impose a 
general obligation on the parti es, in either indi vidual or co llective employment 
agreements, to deal with each other in good faith, without undertaking misleading or 
deceitful actions. 15 
Section 32 then provides more specific good faith obligations for collective 
bargaining. This section takes the form of a non-ex haustive list of minimum 
requirements , including an obligation to meet for bargaining, consider proposals from 
each other, provide reasonably necessary information and recognise the role and authority 
of representatives. 16 Bargaining in good faith does not impose an obligation to form an 
agreement. Section 33 specifies the parties do not have to compromise or agree on either 
specific issues or an agreement as a whole. Good faith therefore exists in the ER Act as a 
process based obligation, hence recognising the contradictory interests of the parties, and 
f · h · 17 not orctng t ese interests to an agreement. 
11 See Alistair Dumbleton "The Employment Relations Authority Gets Under Way" (200 1) 26(1) ZJIR 
119. 
12 
Employment Relations Act 2000, s 3(a)(vi). 
13 A concept which had been previously recognised by the Courts as existing within the employment 
relationship, see Pelllberton v WAS Ltd [ 1999] 2 ERNZ 436, ..iso (Emp Ct) Goddard CJ. 
14 With the excepti on of s 149C amendment to Labour Relations Act 1987 which was repealed oon after 
its inclusion. 
15 Section 4( I ), which include action which are likely to mislead or deceive each other. 
16 
Employment Relations Act 2000, s 32( 1). 
17 Geoff Davenport "Good Faith Bargaining - What does it Really Mean" (2000) 6 ELB 113, 120. 
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C The Code of Good Faith 
1 Legal Starus of rhe Code 
To supplement section 32, a Code of Good Faith for Bargaining for Collective 
Agreement (the Code), has been approved by the Minister of Labour. 18 The Department 
of Labour recommended the Code should maintain a benchmark rather than regulatory 
form, effectively making it a guideline. 19 Section 39 provides that the Authority or 
Employment Court (the Court) may have regard to such an approved Code, 20 reinforc ing 
the recommendatory not compulsory nature . The enforceability of the Code in practice is 
therefore essentially in the hands of the authorities. The Chief Justice of the Employment 
Court has asserted his interpretation that the ER Act " requires the Court. .. to have regard 
to any Code of good faith." 21 Section 32(3) includes approved Codes and individual 
good faith agreements as matters "which are relevant" to the determination of good faith, 
wording which may strengthen the provisions of the Code. Therefore despite the 
benchmark label , it appears the Code is likel y to be held in hi gh es teem while 
determining the existence of good faith. Perhaps the most practical summation of the 
legal position of the Code is that asserted by its founding committee: 22 
Parties who vo luntarily follow the guidance of the code in working out their own 
collective bargaining approach can reduce the potential of liti gation and legal 
intervention. Following the guidance in the code will ensure that in most cases a 
q11estion of whether or not an action is taken in good faith will not arise. 
2 Content of rhe Code 
In accordance with its supplementary nature, the Code incorporates the 
format and substantive provisions of section 32, and then provides further specific 
18 
Pursuant to Employment Relations Act 2000 s 35, as notified by Hon Margaret Wilson (2 October 2000) 
IV New Zealand Ca-::.ette 3523-3525. 
19 See John Hughes "The Collective Bargaining Code of Good Faith" (2001) 26( 1) NZJIR 59,60 for 
discussion on the policy development of the type of Code to be estab li shed. 
20 This mirrors the words of the equivalent section 20(9) of the Health and Safety 111 Employment Act 1992. 
In thi s Act, the wording has remained relatively unchallenged, although it should al o be n tecl that in some 
cases compliance with the Code has not been sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Act. See Hughes, 
above, 65. 
21 
TG Goddard "The Only Constant is Change ... The Changed Role of the Emp loyment Court under the 
Employment Relations Act 2000" (2000) 6 ELB 113.119 
22 
Interim Good Faith Bargaining Committee '·Consultation on Draft Code of Good Faith for Bargaining for 
Collective Agreement" ( l l September 2000) < http ://www. nzi r.dol.govt.nz/oldsite/update/new/Code"*'20 
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details. Section 32(l)(a), requiring the parties to use their best endeavours to form 
a bargaining process agreement, is extensively expanded upon in this way. 
Whereas the section remains quite broad , clause 2.2 of the Code lists twenty 
matters which should be considered where relevant. Included are matters such as 
the size and composition of the bargaining team , timing, venue and frequency of 
bargaining meetings , costs and completion .23 Further substantive clarifications 
include requiring considerations for proposals over a reasonable time, reasons for 
refusal, and procedures for disagreement. 24 
D Remedies 
The practical impact of legislation is often highly dependent on the 
effectiveness of the enforcement and remedies available. This is particularly true 
of the good faith obligation, which was introduced amidst controversy as to how 
the obligation would work in practice. Section 16l(f) provides jurisdiction for the 
Authority to determine whether the good faith has been complied with . However, 
as soon as a matter is brought before the Authority, section 159 prescribes the first 
action as determining whether the matter would be appropriate for mediation, and 
if so, to direct such mediation. 
Section 137(l)(a)(ii) allows compliance orders to be issued if it is found 
collective bargaining was not undertaken in good faith . These orders must include 
a time limit, 25 and any other limits which the Authority sees fit. 26 Although 
penalties are not directly available for a breach of good faith , section 140(6) 
outlines the measures which the Court may undertake to enforce an order to 
bargain in good faith , which includes penalties of up to $40 OOO. 
The aforementioned actions operate on the premise an agreement has not 
of%20GFB %20for%20Coll%20Agmt.html> (last accessed 18 August 2001 ) 
23 
For the full list see Code of Good Faith for Bargaining for Collecti ve Agreement (2 October 2000) IV 
New Zealand Ga:eue 3523-3525 , cl 2.2(a) - (t) (the Code) . 
24 
The Code, above, cl 4.3-4. 7. 
25 
Employment Relations Act 2000, s 137(3) . 
26 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 13 (4), this order then is enforceable in the same manner as a Di stri ct 
Court Order, s 141 . 
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yet been achieved. If bargaining is completed, and a collective agreement formed , 
the Authority does not have jurisdiction to cancel or vary a term or agreement,27 
as they may with an individual agreement procured by unfair bargaining. 28 This 
attempt to preserve the finality of a collective agreement29 may only be disturbed 
by the limited ability of the Court to suspend and reopen bargaining on certain 
terms, perhaps with mediation .30 In any situation, the opportunity to seek common 
law damages for the breach of good faith remains open. 
Ill GOOD FAITH BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
A United State's Statutory Provisions 
Good faith bargaining in United States labour law is found in the collective 
bargaining definition of the National Labour Relations Act 1935 (NLRA ). 31 Section 8(d) 
outlines the; 32 
mutual ob li gation of the employer and the representative of the e mployees to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good fa ith with respect to wages, hours and other 
terms and condi tions of employment. 
This obligation has been refined and developed by the National Labour Relations Boards 
(NLRB or Board) and the United States Court of Appeals. This development began with 
the principle, "the Act does not compel any agreement whatsoever between employees 
and employers,"33 a position equivalent to section 33 of the ER Act. From thi s beginning 
the Boards and Courts have devi sed numerous specific principles and test for certain 
~4 
aspects of labour law. -' 
27 
Section 163 restricts the Authority, and is ex tended to the Court under s 190( 1), see also s 192. 
28 
Employment Rel ati ons Act 2000, s 69. 
29 
Robyn Mackay (ed) Employ111ent Law Guide (5 ed, Butterworth , Wellington)l 76, ERpt 5.5. 
30 
Employment Relations Act 2000, 192 
31 
National Labour Relatio ns Act 29 USC§ 151-67 (1964). 
12 
Nationa l Labour Relati o ns Ac t 29 USC§ 158 (1964). 
31 
NLRB v A111 erica11 Na1io11a l Insurance (l 952) 343 US 395, 402. 
34 
See Part Ill E Contentious Areas of Good Faith in the Uni ted States and Canada. 
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1 Good faith process 
Allegations of breaches of good faith are made to the NLRB as unfair labour 
practices, which the appropriate field office will investigate and pursue if it finds 
substance in the claim. 35 Section lO(c) confers wide discretion for the Board to "take 
such affirmative action .... as will effectuate the policies."36 In essence the deciding 
authority can formulate an appropriate remedy for the unfair labour practice, yet these 
usually tend to be bargaining orders,37 or access and notice remedies. 38 
B Canadian Good Faith Provisions 
One fundamental distinguishing feature between Canadian and United States 
labour law is the jurisdictional level of operation. Canadian labour law issues primarily 
fall within the jurisdiction of the provinces, 39 with limited iss ues within federal 
jurisdiction. The Canada Labour Code40 directs these latter issues , which along with 
previous federal legislation , tends to bon-ow principles from the United States.41 Section 
50 imposes a requirement to "meet and commence, to bargain collectively in good faith" 
and "make every reasonable effort to enter into a collective agreement."42 Requirements 
which are clearly similar to the LRA provisions . In terms of the daily impact of labour 
law, each Canadian province also imports a similar general good faith bargaining 
obligation.-13 Overall, Canadian labour laws bear a strong resemblance to the United 
States system, highlighting how one jurisdiction can combine another's experience with 
their own legal identity to develop similar, yet unique labour principles. 
3
) National Labour Relations Board <http ://www.n lrb.gov/facts.html> (last accessed 10 August 2001). 
36 
National Labour Relations Act 29 USC§ 158 (1964). 
37 
Also known as Gissel Bargaining Orders, NLRB v Cissel Packing Co ( 1969) 395 US 575, 610. 
38 
Leonard Page, General Counsel , National Labour Relations Board "NLRB Remedies : Where are they 
Going?" ( 10 April 2000) Press Release R-2388, l. 
39
Toronto Electric Po1Ver Com111issioners I' Snider et al [ l 925] AC 396 (PC). 
4° Canada Labour Code RSC 1985 cL-2, which retains jurisdiction over certain labour activities which are 
of an inter-provincial nature as defined ins 2 . 
41 
Gina Fiorelli "Good Faith Bargaining in Canadian Labour Law: An Overview of the Law" (Paper 
prepared for the Counci l of Trade Unions, May 2000) 4. 
42 
Canada Labour Code RSC 1985 cL-2, s 50(a). 
43 
Fiorelli, above, 3. For the purposes of thi s paper the Canada Labour Code will primarily be referred to as 
representative of the provinces' labo ur law requirements. 
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C Relevant Distinctions between North American and New Zealand Laws 
In looking to any foreign legal developments, differences between the legal 
systems and potential impacts must be borne in mind. Several such features anse 
between the No11h American and New Zealand systems. Union certification is the most 
regulated process within the United States' and Canadian systems.4 .. As there is no 
equivalent process in New Zealand, the statutory focus is instead on collective 
bargaining ... 5 This distinction is likely to see major differences in the form of good faith 
claims in ew Zealand. North American bad faith claims primarily arise as the union is 
campaigning for certification during specified time limits. Employer tactics to delay or 
undermine the union therefore have a detrimental effect, which is unparalleled in New 
Zealand. 
1 Mandatory Bargaining Subjects 
Deriving from section 8(d) of the LRA, the United States alone recogrnses 
mandatory bargaining subjects, which a party can insist on to an impasse, and permissive 
subjects, on which parties can negotiate, but not insist on.46 This distinction is relevant in 
direct dealing good faith claims,47 where the communication must be on a mandatory 
subject. New Zealand may here follow Canada's lead, and acknowledge this distinction, 
while simultaneously establishing a comparable base with reference to "matters relating 
to terms and conditions of employment."48 
2 Political influences and union strength 
The underlying context in the United States, specifically the politicisation of the 
LRB, and relatively weak status of unions, must also be acknowledged. LRB 
44 
Ellen Dannin "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and Information Requests: The United States 
Experience"(2001) 26(1) NZJIR 45, 48. 
45 
In New Zealand unions must be registered in accordance with Part 4 to collectively bargain, yet do not 
have the politically charged election campaigning process for certification as found in North America. 46 
NLRB v Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp (1958) 356 US 342. See further "Major Operational 
Decisions and Free Collective Bargaining: Eliminating the Mandatory/ Permissive Distinction" (1989) 
I 02 Harv L Rev 1971 , I 971. 
47 As the investigation in the United States may be 111itiall y more focused on determining whether the 
subject matter is of communication was a mandatory subject. Gina Fiorelli .. Good Faith Bargaining in 
Canadian Labour Law: An Overview of the Law" (Paper prepared for the Council of Trade Uni on~. Ma) 
2000 ) -l-5. 
48 
Employment Relati ons Act '.WOO ,~ 32( I )( cl ). 
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members are appointed by the President,49 and therefore perceived as holding political 
bias. The correlation between the political party in power at the time of Member 
appointment and the outcome of unfair labour practices has been found to be 
"particularly robust."5° Consequently there is a constant turnover in members, with each 
Board applying minimal deference to previous decisions. 51 This effect can be 
compounded by the coercive and illegal tactics employers have utilised against unions , 
with little or inadequate remedies available. 52 Inadequac ies of NLRA's remedies are said 
to include focusing on reparation of minor individual harm, rather than preventing 
collective interference,53 and the considerable delay in achieving remedies . Where 
employers partake in stalling tactics, with no effective counter from the LRB , the 
union's presence, perceived ability and certification status are severely disadvantaged. 54 
3 Restrictions on employer involvement with unions 
A further notable disparity between ew Zealand and orth American laws is the 
control of union involvement by employers. Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA,55 and section 
94(l)(a) of the Canadian Labour Code,56 prohibit employers from participating or 
interfering with the formation or administration of unions, with the United States also 
restricting domination or financial contribution by employers. 57 When employee 
pa11icipation plans are in question, preliminary questions of whether such plans constitute 
' labour organi sations,' must be addressed in accordance with these sections. 58 
49 
National Labour Relati ons Board <www. nlrb .gov/fac ts. html> (last accessed 10 Aug 2001 ) 
'
0 
Jame~ Brudney, Sara Sch,a vani and Deborah Merritt ··Judicial Hostility Toward Labour Unions'1 
Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern" (1999) 60 Ohio State Law J 1675, 1737 . 
51 
Robert Brownstone "The National Labour Relations Board at 50, Po litic isation Creates Cri sis" ( 1986) 52 
Brook L Rev 229, 243 . 
52 Paul Weiler "Promises to Keep Securing Worker' s Ri ghts to Self Organi sa ti on under the National Labour 
Relations Act" (1983) 96 Harv L Rev 1769, 1769-74. 
53 w ·1 e, er , above, 1788. 
54 
Weiler , above, 1795. 
55 
National Labour Relations Act 29 USC§ 15 8 (1964). 
56 
Canada Labour Code RSC 1985 cL-2,s Chap L-2, s 94( l )(a). 
57 
Both sections have further qualifications and descriptions which these prohibitions are subject to. 
58 
Devki Virk, "Participation with Representation : Ensuring Worker ' s Rights in Co-operative 
Management" (1994) U Ill L Rev 729 , 741. 
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D Value of North American Developments to New Zealand 
In looking to North American developments it is important to account for these 
disparities. In this manner it has been repeatedly emphasised neither the ER Act, nor the 
good faith obligation, is an attempt to transplant orth American laws into ew Zealand, 
and the ER Act must develop its own identity. 59 On the other hand, it has been suggested 
"it is not necessary to ' reinvent the wheel."'60 As the ER Act nears its second year of 
enactment, it remains to be thoroughly tested, 61 hence leaving North American principles 
as possible guidance. This notion was acknowledged whilst developing the Code, with a 
tri-partite tour of the United States and Canada to increase understanding as to how "the 
principles were actually applied in practice."62 
E Contentious Areas of Good Faith in the United States and Canada 
As both North American jurisdictions have relatively broad statutory good faith 
obligations, the specific principles developed during practical implementation may be the 
most useful to New Zealand. One good faith issue which has proved particularly 
contentious is suiiace bargaining. This allegation runs a fine line between permissible 
'hard ' bargaining and the impermissible feigning of intent to form a collective 
agreement. 63 At the other end of the good faith scale is the collection of actions which 
have come to be treated as per se breaches of good faith. Refusing to bargain , failing to 
meet, changing previously agreed terms, undermining a representatives authority, 
refusing access, failing to provide necessary information , communicating directly with 
employees, and insistence on extreme proposals have emerged as bad faith actions.64 
59 Ellen Dannin "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and Information Requests: The United States 
Experience"(200 1) 26(1) NZJIR 45, 46. 
60 Judy Brown "Good Faith Bargaining and the Disclosure of Information under the ER Act," (2001) 1 ELB 
I. 2. 
61 o difficult or contentious issues have been dealt with by the Authority, Court or Court of Appeal. See 
Part VIII A Employment Court and Authority Determinations. 
62 Anne Knowles and James Ritchie "Good Faith Bargaining in orth America" (Report of tudy Tour to 
USA and Canada, l March 2001) 
63 El len Dannin ·'Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and information Requests: The United States 
Experience"(2001) 26(1) NZJIR 45, 52 and Gina Fiorelli "Good Faith Bargaining in Canadian Labour 
Law: An Overview of the Law" (Paper prepared for the Counci l of Trade Unions, May 2000) 9. 
64 See Dannin, above, 49, for United States' examples and Fiorelli, above, 10-18 for Canadian examples. 
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A parallel may be drawn in between many of these 'bad faith' actions and the 
effect on the union 's status, either in terms of the bargaining at hand, or in the eyes of its 
membership. Enacting good faith obligations recognises there is an inequality in 
bargaining power, and aLLempls Lo redress thi s through a1d1 ng and supporting crnplu;ccs 
to pursue collective opportunities, should they so choose. 65 Most of these ' bad faith' 
actions attack this support, or otherwise drastically increase the employer's strength in 
some form. The ER Act in identifying within its objects the need to address the "inherent 
inequality of bargaining power,"66 in conjunction with promoting collective bargaining 
and individual choice,67 expresses recognition of the need for these protections. 
Subsequently many of these principles have been incorporated into the ER Act, perhaps 
as an attempt to pre-empt issues which have arisen in orth Ame1ica.68 
1 Direction of this paper 
This paper will draw on the North American expenence in terms of two good 
faith issues; surface bargaining and communication with employees. Surface bargaining 
has arisen as a general yel comp lex claim, v\h 1ch has not been dircctl1 addressed \\ 1th1n 
the ER Act. It is a claim which often depends on the existence of other specific good 
faith breaches , such as communication with employees. This issue has a controversial 
history in New Zealand, and was vigorously debated through the passage of the ER Act, 
resulting in a highly anticipated future . 
IV SURFACE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
A Definition 
Surface bargaining is an illusive concept in North America, a general allegation 
which is difficult both to pinpoint and substantiate. Royal Bank of Canada, Kenogami, 
65 D . b annin, a ove, 47. 
66 
Employment Relat ions Act 2000, s 3(a)(ii). 
07 
Employment Relations Act 2000, s3(a)(iii) and (iv) respectively. 
68 
For exampl e, with respect to co mmunica tion with employees (or direct dealing) provisions, it has been 
noted that " the ERA essentially codifies matters which have been left as common law in the United States." 
Ellen Dannin " Good Faith Bargaining, Direc t Dealing and In formation Req uests: The U nited States 
Experience"(200 1) 26(1) NZJIR 45, 54. 
11 
Quebec et al
69 
formulated what has essentially become the Canadian definition of su1iace 
· · 70 bargammg: 
'Surface bargaining ' is a term which describes a going through the motions, or a 
preserving of the surface indications of bargaining without the intent of concluding a 
collective agreement. ... .The parties to collective bargaining are expected to act in 
their individual self interest and in doing so are entitled to take firm positions which 
may be unacceptable to the other side .......... the distinction between hard 
bargaining and bargaining in bad faith lies essentially on an appreciation of the facts 
in each case and must take into account their entire relati onship. 
This elaboration also reflects the United States ' pos1t1on on surface bargaining, which 
particularly emphasises the totality of conduct over individual actions. 71 It can therefore 
be hypothesised that surface bargaining will not arise as a specific breach of the ER Act, 
and instead will rely on the absence of required intent, ascertained from the entirety of the 
employer's conduct. 72 Surface bargaining appears to go to the heart of what good faith is 
trying to minimise, parties' eluding their responsibility to build productive employment 
relationships. 
B The Process of Pursuing a Surface Bargaining Claim 
North American surface bargaining claims have predominantly been pursued as 
breaches of their respective general good faith sections. 73 Canada's section SO(a)(ii) 
69 Royal Bank of Canada, Kenoga111i, Quebec et al ( 1980) 41 di 199 (CLRB ) (Royal Bank) 
70 
Royal Bank, above, 212, approving T!te Daily Ti111es [1978] OLRB Rep Jul y 60-t. See al!>O Rewil Clerk:, 
!11remational Union, Local 206 v Maclean-Hunter Cable TV Ltd (1980) 42 di 274,286 (CLRB) and 
Canadian U11ion of Public Employees v Iberia Airlines of Spai11 [ 1990] 80 di 165, 190 (CLRB ). 
71
Established in the United States in NLRB v Tmitt Manufacruring Co (1956) 351 US 149,155, where the 
Court asserted its right to use "the previous relations between the parties, antecedent events explaining the 
behaviour at the bargaining table, and the course of negotiations," in determining the state of mind of the 
defendant. 
72 Although either party could undertake surface bargaining, in most situations it is the employer, hence this 
paper will refer to claims a being again t employers. This stance is supported by the fact that collective 
bargaining is essentially the reason a union exists, so it is in the union's best interests to collectively 
bargain with intent to form an agreement. Alternatively employers exist for reasons more than ju t 
collective bargaining, and indeed may not wish to collectively b?rgain at all. Shieber "Surface Bargaining: 
the Problem and a Proposed Solution" (1974) 5 U Toi L Rev 656,659. 
73 National Labour Relations Act 1935 29 USC§ 158 (1964) s 8(d) and Canada Labour Code RSC lV 
1985, s 50. 
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requirement to make every reasonable effort to enter an agreement,74 also encompasses 
an intent to only Sllliace bargain. The concept of surface bargaining has been described as 
the most contentious that Labour Boards are required to approach. 75 This could be 
attributable to the general nature of the issue, and the reliance on determining intent, as 
opposed to an observable behaviour. Initially these difficulties resulted in the practical 
implication that surface bargaining claims were predominately only successful if they 
were pursued conjointly with another unfair labour practice.76 
There is a fine line between the permissible adoption of a firm stance, or hard 
bargaining, and a finding of surface bargaining. The prediction of guidelines is also 
limited by the assertion that "no two surface bargaining cases are alike and good faith can 
have meaning only as applied to the particular facts in a particular case."77 This feature 
adds to the caution which New Zealand must undertake when seeking guidance from 
North American cases generally. Yet with no legislative direction, North American 
guidance may shed the only light on the darkness surrounding surface bargaining in ew 
Zealand. 78 
C Determining Employer's Intent 
In the United States and Canada a surface bargaining claim turns on the intent of 
the defendant. Although this might distinguish it from other unfair labour practices, it is 
not an unachievable task. Courts regularly undertake these decisions within many facets 
of law, primarily inferring such mens rea from objective evidence.79 United States 
Labour Relation Boards have asserted that in order to do so they will consider the 
74 
Canada Labour Code RSC 1985, s 50(a)(ii) 
75 
Michael Bendel "A Rational Process of Persuasion: Good Faith Bargaining in Ontario" ( 1980) U 
Toronto LJ 1, 27-28 & Bruce Meizlish '·Surface Bargaining: A Problem in eed of a Remedy" (1985) Det 
Co ll L Rev 721, 721. 
76 
Bendel, above, 21. 
77Nariona/ Labour Relariom Board\ ' A111erican Nwional lns11m11ce Co (1952) 343 US 395, -HO, see also 
Electri-F/ex Company v Int ernational Associa1ion of Maclti11is1s and Aerospace Workers, AFL-C/0 ( 1978) 
238 NLRB 7 13, 73 1. 
78 
A position alluded to in an ear ly uthoriLy determination, see Pan V!ll A 2 The Independent Newspapers 
case. 
79 
Ellen Dannin "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and Information Requests : The United States 
Experience"(2001) 26(1) NZJIR 45, 51. 
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substantive content of proposals from the bargaining.8° For instance where the 
employer's proposals "are so unusually harsh and unreasonable that they are predictably 
unworkable ... [and] ... would have left the Union and the employees with substantially 
fewer rights and less protection,"81 a surface bargaining claim would be likely to succeed. 
Similarly Canadian Labour Relation Boards trace bargaining progress on key issues such 
as wages, union status and management rights. 82 The employer's attitude towards their 
own proposals may also be appropriate to consider. 83 One accepted example of such a 
bad faith attitude is a "take it or leave it" offer, 84 which now stands as a per se violation 
of good faith. 85 
1 Tracing Progress 
Other indications of surface bargaining include continually inflexible stances, 
submitting proposals which the party knows will be completely unacceptable, or 'talking 
to death' issues. 86 NLRB v A-1 Kinf? Size Sanclwiches87 illustrates how Courts look 
through such proposals. The Board initially examined what proposals had been tabled, 
including those pertaining to wages, management rights and no-strike clauses. The 
dissimilarities to the previous contract and employer's reaction to Union's counter-
proposals were then noted. Ultimately it was found the company "insisted on unilateral 
control over virtually all significant terms and conditions of employment," throughout 
these proposals. For instance, where the Union objected to the wide nature of a clause, 
the employer would reply with a broader clause.88 The central factor in NLRB 
investigations such as these, is the search for the 'patently unreasonable proposal. ' 89 
80APT Medical Tral!Sportation v National Association of Covem111e11t Employees (2001) 333 NLRB No 98, 
6 citing McClatchy Newspapers v NLRB (1997) 131 F.3d 1026, 1034 (DC Cir) 
8 1 National Labour Relations Board v A-1 King Size Sandwiches Inc (1984) 732 F.2d 872,877 (11 th Cir) 
referring to NLRB v Wrights Motors (1979) 603 F.2d 604,610 (7 th Cir) and NLRB v Johnson 
Manufacturing Company of Lubbock (1972) 458 F.2d 453 (5
th 
Cir). 
82 Bruce Meizlish "S urface Baroainino: A Problem in Need of a Remedy" (1985] Det Coll L Rev 721, 723. ~ 0 0 
Meizlish, above, 727. 
84 '\ILRB 1· !n .1 111m1ce Agenr.1' !nre1w1rionol Union AFL-C/0 ( 1960) 361 US -P7, ..i85 . 
85 Compare with the position in Tucker Wool Processors Ltd v Harrison (1999] 1 ERNZ 894 (CA) Keith J, 
where the Court of Appeal allowed the presentation of 'take it or leave it' contracts under the EC Act. 
86 Michael Bendel "A Rational Process of Persuasion: Good Faith Bargaining in Ontario" (1980) U 
Toronto LJ l, 28 . 
87
NLRB v A-1 King Size Sand1Viclres (1984) 732 F.2d 872, (11 
th 
Cir) 874-877. 
88 
NLRB v A-1 King Size Sand1Viclres, above, 877. 
89 Michael Bendel "A Rational Proces of Persuasion: Good Faith Bargaining in Ontario" (1980) U 
Toronto LJ 1, 31, see Elecrri-F/ex Colllpany v lntemarional Associarion of Machinists and Aerospace 
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2 Relationship to Other Unfair Labour Practices 
Unfair labour practices are often supplemented with a surface bargaining 
allegation. The only substantive evidence of surface bargaining may in fact be a single 
unfair labour practice. orth American surface bargaining claims have been observed 
primarily based on unfair labour practices such as refusals to supply relevant 
information,
90 
discharges and threats,91 delays in offering proposals, or refusing to supply 
reasoning for negotiation decisions. 92 
D Standard and Extent of Approach 
] Objecli\ '(! /(!Sf j cJCIISing Oil {(){CL /i! y of co11c/11cl 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Royal Oak Min es lnc v Canada Labour 
Relations Board asserted "the making of a reasonable effort to bargain should be 
measured by an objective standard which can be ascertained by a board looking to 
comparable standards and practices within the particular industry."93 The incorporation of 
this objective element may increase the deterrent effect of a surface bargaining finding. 
The ability of Courts to directly compare conduct may put employers on caution as to 
their intended actions. The determination is also made in light of the totality of conduct, 
which extends to conduct away from the bargaining table and prior relationships between 
the union and employer. 94 
2 Restriction 011 Examining into Agree111e11r 
onetheless . the use of these subjecti ve e'< aminations is intended to he limited to 
infening intent. It has been stressed the Board does not "directly or indirectly, compel 
concessions or otherwise sit in judgement upon the substantive terms of collective 
Work ers, A FL-CIO (I 978) 238 NLRB 71 3, 716. 
9
°K-Mart Co,poration v NLRB (1980) 626 F.2d 704, 707 (9th Cir). 
91 
Electri-F/ex Company v /11t ematio11al As ociatio11 of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-C/0, 
above, 73 1. 
92
APT Medical Transportation v National Association of Go vernment Employees (2001 ) 333 NLRB No 98, 
12. 
93 
Royal Oak Mines Inc v Canada Labour Relations Board (1996]1 SCR 369 , 396-7 para 42 
94 
NLRB v Trui(( Manufacturing Co (1956) 351 US 149, 155, see al o Bruce Meizlish "Surface Bargaining: 
A Problem in Need of a Remedy" [l 985J Det Coll L Rev 72 1, 724. 
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bargaining agreements."
95 
This has arisen as a fine line, with the suggestion that the 
North American courts have in fact bluJTed the line between procedural and substantive 
faimess. 96 
E Remedies in United States and Canada 
The effectiveness of North American labour remedies is particularly contentious 
for surface bargaining claims. Claims against employers are often perceived of little 
value to unions. If the true complaint is that no intent to form a collective agreement 
exists, the pursuit of this claim is likely to lead into a lengthy Board and Court process. 
By implication, an employer with strong anti-union animus may engage in surface 
bargaining, and be prepared to bear the brunt of litigation in order to stay the union for as 
long as possible. If the claim succeeds, the likely remedy is merely an order to bargain, 
which still does not guarantee an agreement for the union . Meanwhile, the employer is 
likely to have benefited from the exclusion of improved conditions, and may continue to 
do so following the finding. 97 Canadian Boards often direct the parties to a mediator, in 
an attempt to settle some of their differences. 98 
F North American Surface Bargaining Conclusions 
Where one party is bargaining with no true intent to form an agreement, a breach 
of a general good faith provision may be sought in the form of surface bargaining. 
Although these claims were only originally successful if brought in conjunction with 
other unfair labour practices, surface bargaining is developing strength as a stand alone 
claim. No1th American claims are decided on a case-by-case basis , yet guidance may be 
drawn from the factors which both the United States and Canadian autho1ities often 
consider. Emphasis is placed on the totality of the conduct, in the often harsh climate of 
collective bargaining. The Boards then examine the substantive content of the proposals , 
without judging or changing them. Factors searched for include ideas blatantly and 
knowingly unacceptable, whether the union member 's position will decrease, and the 
95NLRB v A111erican National In surance Agents (1952) 343 US 395,404. 
96 Steven Fraser "Good Faith Bargaining" (2000) I ELB 13, 14 
97 Bruce Meizlish "Surface Bargaining : A Problem in Need of a Remed y" [1985] Det Coll L Rev 721, 729. 
98 Michael Bendel "A Rational Process of Persuasion: Good Faith Bargaining in Ontario" (1980) U 
Toronto LJ 1, 21. 
16 
degree of flexibility each party has expressed in relation to these proposals. The 
possibility of intra-industry comparison is highlighted as a viable measure of determining 
the reasonableness of such bargaining positions. The recurrences of these factors assist in 
establishing stability in an otherwise elusive concept. 
V SURFACE BARGAINING IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Status of Surface Bargaining in New Zealand Law 
The ER Act enters a framework which previously did not require the parties to 
negotiate, let alone negotiate in good faith, 99 leaving surface bargaining as unexplored 
teJTitory. Despite no section directly addressing surface bargaining, there are indications 
that many North American principles have been acknowledged. Moreover, an early 
Authority determination has laid a foundation, in commenting that "surface bargaining 
would be in breach of New Zealand law." 100 
1 The exclusion of an express provision 
By including issues that have arisen in North America, section 32 clarifies these 
actions as clear breaches of the ER Act. 101 Although the inclusion of such elements can 
be linked to the development of foreign surface bargaining law, the exclusion of a 
specific surface bargaining provision must be read as intentional. In developing the Code, 
union representatives proposed a surface bargaining clause containing "parties should not 
simply 'go through the motions ' of bargaining with no real intent to reach an agreement 
on a matter." 102 This clause is a direct reference to surface bargaining, yet was not 
included in the final Code due to strong employer opposition in the tri-partite process. 
The opposition centred on the 'prescriptive subjective' element this clause would involve. 
This was submitted to contravene the objective nature the ER Act and Code had 
99 Gordon Anderson "Collective Bargaining and the Law: New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act Five 
Years on" (1996) 9 AJLL 103, I 14. 
'
00 New Zealand Amalga111ated Engineering Printing & Man11fac111ring Union ( Inc) v Independent 
Newspapers Lid (3 August 2001) Employment Relations Authority Wellington, WAS l/0 I, GJ Wood. 
101 For example, the responsibilities to meet for bargaining and consider and respond to proposals, which 
hence prohibit refusing to meet and 'take it or leave it ' offers, as developed in North America. 
102 Interim Good Faith Bargaining Committee "Consultation on Draft Code of Good Faith for Bargaining 
for Coiiecti ve Agreement" ( I J September 2000), < http://www.nzir.dol.govt.nz/oldsite/update/new/Code% 
20 of%20GFB%20for%20Coll %20Agmt.htmi> (last accessed 20 August 2001) cl 4.8. 
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conformed to. 
103 
In the absence of such a provision, surface bargaining in the ER Act will 
need to be established elsewhere. If the claim at hand does not consist of any behaviour 
prohibited by section 32, it will need to be pursued as a general breach of good faith 
under section 4. 
B Related Sections in the ER Act 
I General Good Faith Requirements 
Section 4 of the ER Act i comparable Lo the broad good faith sec tions in the 
labour laws of United States and Canada. Accordingl y section --I- may be percci\,ed a~ a 
strong section to pursue surface bargaining under. The feigning of intent seen in surface 
bargaining may also be deemed a form of deceit, bringing it within the realm of section 
4(b). 
2 Specific Good Faith Requirements 
(a) Bargaining Agreement Obligations 
The section 32 bargaining agreement obligations are the first which appear as 
somewhat directed at minimising surface bargaining. The relevant considerations 
included in clause 2.2 of the Code, would make it increasingly difficult to avoid serious 
bargaining. These factors are not st1ictly mandatory, however the use of "best 
endeavours" appears to impose quite a heavy responsibility on the parties, which may be 
likened to the Canadian requirement of u ing "best efforts" to form an agreement. 10~ An 
employer could possibly use this wording in defending an allegation of surface 
bargaining. One may plead they used their best endeavours, yet these were not sufficient 
to form a bargaining agreement, let alone actually bargain. The formation of a bargaining 
agreement, with no actual bargaining is not itself sufficient to fulfil the good faith 
obligation. Clause 4.2 of the Code requires the parties to "adhere to any agreed process 
for the conduct of the bargaining," hence eliminating the possibility a party forming a 
bargaining agreement with no intent to follow through with its provisions. 
(b) Meeting obligations 
103Interim Good Faith Committee, above, cl 6. 
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The section 32(l)(b) requirement for parties to meet "from time to time" for 
bargaining, effectively codifies the judicially developed North American principle that a 
refusal to bargain is a breach of good faith. 105 It stands as a useful section in bringing 
parties to the bargaining table and eliminating 'take it or leave it ' offers. However this 
section does not single-handedly overcome the problem of surface bargaining. Claims 
may often involve parties meeting for bargaining, thus satisfying section 32(l)(b), yet not 
bargaining with the intent to form an agreement. 
(c) Consideration of Proposals 
The section 32(l)(c) responsibility to "consider and respond to the proposa ls 
made by each other" is limited to only the first time proposals are put forth. 106 The Code 
then suggests good faith requires an explanation for rejection of a proposa!. 107 An 
employer entering bargaining to fulfil section 32(l)(b), who then repeatedly turns down 
proposals with little consideration or reasoning, would be thought to be surface 
bargaining, and be explicitly caught by section 32(l)(c). In these circumstances, North 
American authorities look for plausible, legitimate reasons to support the bargaining 
stance, the absence of which infers intent to surface bargain. The ER Act appears to have 
drawn on these judicial methods , and then drafted them as an express bargaining 
requirement. Although this still allows New Zealand Courts to retrospectively infer 
intent, it also encourages the party to utilise these good faith tools during bargaining, in 
an attempt to reduce dependence on judicial intervention. 
C Aspects of Surface Bargaining not Addressed 
In excluding direct surface bargaining provisions, and maintaining an objective 
Act, the opportunity has been given to the Authority and Court to develop surface 
bargaining claims, processes and remedies. It is foreseeable that surface bargaining 
claims under the ER Act will adopt an approach similar to the 'patently unreasonable 
104 
Canada Lab ur Code RSC 1985 cL-2, ~ SO(a)(11). 
105 
Ellen Dannin "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and Information Requests: The Umted States 
Experience"(2001) 26(1) NZJIR 45, 49. 
106 
Employment Relations Act 2000, s 32(2). 
107 
Code of Good Faith for Bargaining for Collective Agreement (22 September 2000) cl 4.5. The 
information provisions of the ER Act are also applicable in proposal reasoning, see Employment Relations 
Act 2000, s 32(J)(e) and s 34. 
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proposal' approach followed in orth America. 108 In ascertaining reasonableness, the 
authorities may examine the proposal content, trace bargaining progress, or make intra-
industry comparisons. The importance placed on totality of conduct opens the door for 
conduct away from the table to also be examined. However thi s door is limited by the 
timeframe of the ER Act, as conduct and relationships prior to enactment were not 
subject to good faith, and can therefore not be included. 109 
United States and Canadian case law adopts a clause by clause analysis to 
determine the true intent of a party. Even if this analysis results in a surface bargaining 
breach of good faith, the authority cannot vary, cancel or impose terms on an agreement. 
However these proposals are likely to be compared to previous employment agreement 
conditions, relevant rates of inflation, and reasonable industry standards. 110 These 
practices demonstrate a fairly structured approach, which may answer some of the 
demands of how good faith will be fairly and consistently determined. It should also be 
borne in mind that determining such mental elements is undertaken by Courts everyday. 
Although often difficult, it ultimately is a matter of weighing up circumstances and 
questions whether they justify an inference of intent, 111 or otherwise provide a legitimate 
f h d. d · 112 reason or t e 1spute actions. 
D Remedies 
Should the New Zealand Courts develop a concept of surface bargaining, a 
suitable and effective remedy must also be established. The United States and Canada 
have highlighted how ineffective remedies can dull the threat of a surface bargaining 
claim. The ER Act prioritises the use of mediation, which is commonly used in these 
circumstances in Canada. This method is likely to be fast and effective if the parties are 
able to reach an outcome, without resistance from either party. If mediation fails, the 
108 Michael Bendel "A Rational Process of Persuasion: Good Faith Bargaining in Ontario" (1980) U 
Toronto LJ I , 31. 
109 
New Zealand Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Ma1111fac11mng Ullton ( Inc) v Independent 
Newspapers Ltd (3 August 2001) Employment Relations Authority Wellington, W A5 l/O I, GJ Wood, 2. 
110Royal Oak Min es file v Canada Labour Relations Board (1996]1 SCR 369, 396-397 para 42. 
111 Ellen Dannin "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and In formation Requests: The Uni ted States 
Exper ience"(2001) 26(1) NZJIR 45, 51. 
112 
NLRB v Wrights Motors ( 1979) 603 F.2cl 60-t, 609 (7'h Cir). 
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subsequent Authority and Cou11 options may succumb to the increasing delays which 
plague North American claims. The Court's ability to suspend a term and order 
bargaining reopened, 
11 3 
may be of limited value where surface bargaining barred the 
completion of an agreement. A good faith order therefore seems the likely remedy, which 
begs the question of whether ew Zealand orders will end up being perceived as 
meaningless, as they are in North America. The answer will depend on the extent to 
which the Court enforces them. As fines and other powers are avai ]able, 114 it remains to 
be seen to what extent these will be used , and if so, whether these sanctions will be 
sufficient to outweigh the employer's perceived benefit of not settling a new collective 
agreement. 
VI EMPLOYER COMMUNICATION WITH REPRESENTED EMPLOYEES 
A Importance of Communication as a Specific Requirement 
(An indication of the behaviour expected in a collective employment relationship 
can be projected from the minimum requirements in section 32.) Some of the actions 
prohibited have been brought under the auspices of the ER Act as a reactionary measure 
to permissible behaviour under the EC Act, others as lessons learnt from the United 
States and Canada. As illustrated, these actions often affect surface bargaining claims 
through their contribution to the totality of conduct. The drafting of the ER Act has 
elevated the significance of these actions, establishing them as stand alone claims. 
Although the requirements are of equal standing, the future interpretation of the employee 
communication provisions are of particular interest to many, and hence will be addressed 
by this paper. This interest initially derives from the importance of preserving the 
authority of representatives. In New Zealand the Court of Appeal seriously eroding 
union representatives' positions under the EC Act heightened this interest. 
B Relevant United States' and Canadian Principles 
1 Statutory Provisions 
Section 8(a) of the NLRA provides an employer will commit an unfair labour 
11 1 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 192. 
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practice if they "dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labour 
organisation"
11 5 
or refuse to "bargain collectively with the representatives of hi s 
employees."' 
16 
Section 94 or the Canada Labour Code similarly prohibits an employer 
from participating or interfering with the formation and administration of a union or 
representation of employees.' 
17 
Alternatively, the ER Act expressly provides that each 
party must recognise the role and authority of the representative, not bargain, directly or 
indirectly with the represented party, or do anything that will or be likely to undermine 
the authority of the other party. 11 8 In order to be registered, a union must be independent 
and operate at arm 's len gth from an y empl oyer. ' 19 cw Zealand 's provisions ha ve 
emerged as more explicit and specific with regard to communication , with lesser 
clarification on employer interference in unions. 
2 North American case law 
The Supreme Court promptly established it was "c lear that an employer violates 
its duty when it treats directl y with indi \' 1dual empl oyces." 120 The Canadian fo rmulati on 
similarly entails "that employers must be circumspect when communicating with 
employees represented by a bargaining agent, especially when these communications 
occur during the course of negotiations." 121 The concept of respecting the other party's 
representative has remained accepted, with the more contentious questions arising as to 
which particular communications are undermining representation .122 
C The Distinction between Permissible and Impermissible 
1 The Southern California Gas test 
In Southern Calffornia Gas Co123 the Court traversed previous communication 
cases, and formulated a test based on the developed principles. An impermissible 
114 
E mploy me nl Re lati ons Ac t 2000. s 40(6). 
111 
National Labour Re lations Act 29 USC§ l 58, s 8(a)(2). 
116 
ational Labour Relations Act 29 USC § I 58, s 8(a)(5). 
117 Canada Labour Code RSC 1985 cL-2, s 94(l )(a). 
118 
Employment Relations Act 2000, s 32( l )(d). 
11 9 
Employment Relations Act 2000, s 14(1)(d). 
120 See JI Case v NLRB ( J 944) 321 NLRB 332 and NLRB v l11 s11rance Agents ( Prudential Insurance 
Company ) (1960) 361 US 477 . 
121 A.N Shaw Restoration Ltd v OPCM Local 172 (1978] 2 CLRBR 2 14,2 19. 
122 
Al so referred to as direct dealing. 
22 
communication was found to exist if three requirements were fulfilled. Initially the 
employer must have communicated directly with union represented employees. Secondly 
the discussion must be shown to be for the purnose of establishino or chanoino waoes 
t' b bb b> 
hours, terms and conditions of employment or undercutting the union's role. 124 And 
finally the communication must be to the exclusion of the union. 125 
Labour Boards were then required to establish whether the facts would lend 
themselves to these actions and purposes. The first and third requirements require some 
observable and therefore objective conduct. Therefore it is the second limb, charged with 
subjectively finding a necessary putl)OSe, which has proved the most contentious. 126 
Although the ER Act is not bound to follow the direction of the United States, this test is 
speculative as to the approach which may be developed, and can be further understood 
through looking to determinations in practice. 
D Categories of Communication 
1 Employee Involvement Programmes 
Recent human resource management trends have seen the widespread 
implementation of programmes increasing employee involvement in their 
organisations. 127 These programmes are seen as a vehicle to greater efficiency, where 
greater ownership of work leads to increased motivation. However many of the United 
States' unions perceive these programmes as employers merely dressing up their direct 
dealing attempts. 
Permanente Medical Group /nc 128 provides a recent application of the Southern 
California Gas test. The employer deployed selected employees into "design teams ," who 
were empowered to come up with job redesign recommendations for the organisation. 
These teams were found to not be in breach of secLion 8(a)(5). A dec1d1ng factor was the 
123 Sowhem California Gas Co (1995) 3 16 NLRB 979. 
124 
See Part III C l Mandatory Subjects. 
125 Sou them California Gas Co, above, 982, see further Obie Pacific ( 1972.) 196 NLRB 458, 459. 
126 
See Part IV C Determining Employer's Intent.. 
127 (Re) Canadian Broadcastin(? Corp ( 1994) 96 di 122. 132 (CLRB). 
128 Per111a11 e111e Med1rnl Croup In c (2000) 3. 2 LRB No 106 ( Per111wie11te ). 
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employer's continually expressed intent to present the team's recommendations to the 
union for collective bargaining. The employees were also encouraged to create innovative 
suggestions and espouse their own views, as opposed to being a forced voice of the 
129 employer. 
(Re) Canadian Broadcasting 130 provides a similar Canadian example. Here the 
employer implemented a programme which selected employees as leaders , who were 
then trained to canvass other employees for input and feedback on bargaining related 
topics. The Board recognised and expressly discussed the importance such programmes 
play in the modem workforce, increasing efficiency and employee satisfaction. It was 
therefore noted a more collaborative approach was indeed necessary. 131 The union had 
always played a significant role in this particular workplace. Thus the Board found an 
employer cannot implement a programme which invited direct input from unionised 
employees on matters from within the collective agreement, with no involvement 
whatsoever from the union. 132 
2 Questionnaires and Surveys 
In Southern California Gas, the employer was undertaking a cost cutting "re-
invention" programme. The project started with data collection, followed by ' idea 
generation and evaluation' and concluded with recommendations to senior management. 
The union failed to substantiate the claim that any of these steps were attempts to 
undercut their representative status, especially because the data collection was related to 
job processes and design, which were permissible subjects. 133 In addition, management 
were found to have a right to information relating to the "tasks its employees perform on 
a daily basis ..... whether or not it intends to use that information to later formulate 
operational changes or propose changes in the collective-bargaining contract." 13~ 
129 
Permanente, above, 4. 
130 (Re) Canadian Broadcasting Co,p (1994) 96 di 122, 132 (CLRB). 
131 (Re) Canadian Broadcasting Co,p, above, 131-132. 
132The u111on had asked to be involved, and the employer had indicated 1t would meet with the u111on after 
the information had been gathered, but such a meeting never took place. (Re) Canadian Broadcas1i11g Co,p, 
above, 126, 145. 
133 Sow hem Ca/1fomia Gas Co ( 1995) 316 NLRB 979, 983. 
134 S0u1hern California Gas Co, above, 983. 
Southern California Gas re-emphasises that communication to employees is not prima 
facie bad faith. It remains important to establish that the communication is sufficiently 
related to the bargaining topics. 
Fm1her illustration of this p1inciple is found in Logemann Brothers Co, 135 where a 
one-page questionnaire distributed to employees to generate efficiency improving ideas. 
Justifying this communication as permissible, the Court looked to the open-ended nature 
of the questions , the past practice of communication with employees, the distribution to 
all employees and the existence of legitimate business concerns. 136 Where the Board in 
East Tennessee Baptist Hospita/
137 determined a similar survey permissible,138 weight 
was given to the contractual ability to change shift patterns and the mid-contract timing, 
· h d' · · 139 w,t no pen 111g negot1at1ons . 
3 Meetings 1virh Employees 
On a more controversial note, are situations where employers meet directly with 
employees. The employer in Obie Pacific Inc 140 was restructuring, when it held a meeting 
with employees regarding cost cutting and lay-offs within their positions. The Board 
found this meeting could not be described as information dissemination nor idea 
generation, yet instead had the purpose of gaining employee's opinions, to be later used 
in a presentation to the union .14 1 Consequently these actions were found to be "designed 
to undermine the exclusive agency relationship between the agent and its collective 
p1incipals," to the extent they may be "surreptitious espionage" or "open 
· · ,, 14? 111ten-ogat1on. -
Canadian authorities have asserted employers cannot use 'bargaining progress' 
1- -
J) Logemann Brothers Company (1990) 298 NLRB 101 8. 
136 
Logemann Brothers Company, above, 1019-1020. 
137 
East Tennessee Baptist Hospital (1991) 304 NLRB 872. 
138 The survey among employee's related to ways to overcome staffing problems with respect to the 
schedule . 
139 
East Tennessee Baptist Hospital , above, 873. 
140 
Obie Pacific Inc (1972) 196 NLRB 458 , 459 . 
141 
Obie Pacific In c, above, 458 . 
142 
Obie Pactjic Inc, above, 459. 
hift 
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reports to mask direct negotiation attempts. 143 However they are: 
free to explain to it' employees its position with respec t to the collective 
bargaining .... The nature, timing and circumstances of such communications must be 
assessed to determine whether what appears to be permissib le is actually improper. 
For instance, where there was a mature relationship with the urnon, and the 
communications were responsive, in number and content, to union instigated 
communications, these meetings were found to not constitute direct dealing. 144 A 
recurring theme is also the context in which these communications are unde11aken. This 
has been classified as a highly charged, often-heated emotional time, in which it is not 
"inappropriate to pass opinion," 145 and where criticisms will not be treated as 
degradations of authority per se, nor individually evaluated as such. 146 
4 Final Offer 
This type of communication involves the employer directly informin g the 
employees of the final bargaining proposal being presented to the union. The employer in 
CUOE v Brookfield Managem ent Services Lrd147 issued its offer to the represented 
employees and their union simultaneously, immediately before a prea1nnged bargaining 
meeting. This offer was found to be not a violation "provided that the explanation is not 
misleading, coercive or calculated to intimidate, and provided that it has first made the 
employee's bargaining representative aware of its position." 148 In notifying the union , and 
in the specific factual situation of an imminent strike, this offer was found to be made in 
good faith. 
143 
Southern Ontario Newspaper Guild Local 87 v Toronto Star Ne11·spapers Ltd [ l 988] 19 CLRBR ( S) 
374, para 34. 
14
~ Dtrmva Newspaper Guild v DttaH'a Ciri::.en l l 991] I O CLRBR (2d) 203. 31 l para 36. 
145 
Dtraiva Newspaper Guild v D11awa Citi::.en, above, 311 para 37. 
146 
Dllall'a Nell'spaper Guild \' D11mva Ciri::.en, above, 312 para 37, see also Noranda and CA !MAW I I 975 J 
l CLRBR 145,161. 
147 CUDE v Brookfield Management Services Ltd [2000] 63 CLRBR (2d) 238. 
148 CUDE v Brookfield Management Services Ltd, above, para 110 following Perimeter Transportation 
Ltd v ICTU, Local I ( 1990) 9 CLRBR (2d) 264, 266. 
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VII EMPLOYEE COMMUNICATION IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Communication under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 
In determining the intended direction of the ER Act, the appropriate statutory and 
case law developed under the EC Act is highly significant. The EC Act's protection of 
bargaining representative's authority was found in section 12(2). A seemingly simple 
statement that the other party shall recognise the authority of the representative chosen by 
the other party represented the totality of the obligation placed on the parties under the 
EC Act. Two Court of Appeal cases, Capital Coast Health v New Zealand Medical Lab 
Workers Inc
149 
and New Zealand Fire Service v Jvamy, 150 were instrumental in the 
interpretation and consequential practical implications of section 12(2). 
I Capital Coast Health and Ivamy 
Capital Coast Health adopted the obiter statement of Gault J in £ketone v 
Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd
151 
confirming the approach for determining the status of 
bargaining communication: 152 
it is a matter in each case of striking a balance between the competing rights of the 
parties - those of the employer under section 14 of the Bill of Ri ghts Act and those of 
the employee under section 12(2) of the Employment Contracts Act. It is not a case of 
one prevailing over the other, but or both being given sensib le and pracllcal effect 
The Court naITowed the scope further, through the interpretation of 
'negotiations', the period where communication would be most restricted. This was 
limited to the process of mutual discussion , where proposals were being put forth and 
responded to. 153 Additionally, communication of factual information, including 
information related to the bargaining process, was found not to be an interference during 
the proscribed period. lvamy approved and applied the Capital Coast Health approach, 
149 
Capital Coast Health v New Zealand Medical Lab Workers Inc [1996] l NZLR 7 (CA) Hardie Boys J, 
(Capital Coast Health ) 
ISO New Zealand Fire Service v l va 111y [ 1996] 2 NZLR 587 (CA) Gault J (!l'amy) 
151 
Ekerone \' Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd f 1993] 2 ER Z 783. 796 (CA) Gau lt J. 
1
)
2
Capiral Coast Health, above, 18 Hardie-Boys J. 
153 Contrast with !vamy v Ne\\' Zealand Fire Sevice Commission [ 19951 I ERNZ_724, 761 _(Emp C' t). 
Goddard C'J; " It is wi de enough to include all communications. oral or ll'rilten fnrm:d or 111fnrm,il from 
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with emphasis on placing the communications in the context of the parties and bargaining 
at hand. The Court in lvamy then took this a step further, holding an employer was 
entitled to attempt to persuade the employees to withdraw their representatives authority, 
including unjustifiably denigrating the representative, as this was part of the "traditional 
robustness" of collective bargaining.154 
There were a number of communications investigated in Capital Coast Health, 
including general letters, meetings, a proposal which purported to be the one which the 
union had negotiated, and highly critical letters regarding union officials, circulated to 
represented staff. The Court of Appeal held two of the critical letters , and a contract 
proposal which had invited feedback, as breaches of section 12(2) . Although both of 
these types of communications may have been permissible, it was perceived the only 
intent in circulating both to staff could have been undermining the authority and 
intending to negotiate respectively, illustrating the pivotal role of a legitimate reason. 
The permissible communication in lvamy was an information pack outlining the 
employer's latest offer, including a $4000 incentive to sign. This appeared to many as an 
attempt to negotiate directly with staff, which consequently drew strong opposition to the 
Court's ruling. 
The combined effect of Capital Coast Health and Jvamy left the status of a union 
as a representative in a very frail state. Employers could undertake a wide range of 
communication, often critical of and detrimental to the union 's role. Widespread 
opposition was voiced, with the demand for action answered by the legi slative reform of 
the ER Act. 
B Communication Provisions in the ER Act 
1 Section 32( 1 )( d) 
The ER Act has taken the basic ideal of recognising authority from the EC Act, 
and expanded upon it in section 32(l)(d), reflecting many orth American principles. To 
one side to the other, during employment contract negotiations, intended to induce the other side to see or 
accept the first side's point of view." 
154 
New Zealand Fire Service v Ivamy [1996J 2 NZLR 587, 599-600 (CA) Gault J (/va111y) 
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ascertain the full impact, this section must be read in conjunction with the section 5 
interpretation of bargaining. This has been defined widely, initially through "all 
interactions between the parties .... that relate to the bargaining," 155 and extended to 
include all negotiations, and all "communications and con-espondence (between or on 
behalf of the parties, before, during, or after negotiations) that relate to the bargaining." 156 
Incorporating the section 32(l)(d)(ii) inclusion of direct and indirect communication, the 
restricted period has a wide scope. This is increasingly important when contrasted with 
the relatively small period of restricted communication operating following Capital Coast 
Health and lvamy. 
The subsections appear to have their origins based in ove11urning the effect of 
Capital Coast Health and lvamy. Subsections (ii) and (iii) are intended to prevent 
employers acting in bad faith through bypassing the representative. This may be achieved 
through attempting to procure a contract directly with a represented employee, or 
attacking the credibility of the representative, presumably with the desire the employee 
will discharge the representative. The sections eventually enacted are considerably 
weaker than those originally proposed. The Employment Relations Bill essentially 
imposed a blanket ban on communications between employers and employees "about 
matters relating to the terms and conditions of employment." 157 Employers ardently 
opposed this ban, on the basis it would disallow all communication, which was perceived 
as an impractical encroachment on freedom of expression. 158 The ER Act partially 
addressed these concerns by naJTowing the provisions, while also clarifying the intent to 
exclude communications which unde1mine a representative's authority. 159 
2 Freedom of Expression 
The ER Act has not completely displaced the role of freedom of expression and 
the Bill of Rights Act. Section 4(3) allows the parties to communicate statements of fact 
or opinion, reasonably held about the other party. Capital Coasr Health effectively gave 
155 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 5 'barga ining ' (a). 
156 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 5 'bargaining' (b)( i)-( ii ). 
157 Employment Relations Bill 2000, no 8-1, cl 33. 
158 
New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
159 
Through the addition of subsecl!on (i11 ). 
29 
freedom of expression oveITiding importance. In dissenting in Jvamy, Thomas 
passionately attacked this aspect, asserting this 'balance' was provided at the expense of 
collective bargaining. By contrast, the ER Act's provisions focused on the ideal that 
"bargaining representatives should not be able to be bypassed by direct 
· · ,, 160 · 
communications, with freedom of expression acknowledged, but no longer in a 
leading role. In this manner, it can be seen how the alterations made by section 32(l)(d) 
have been characterised as an adoption of Thomas J's "strong dissent" in Jvamy. 161 In 
essence there has been a shift from a neutral position, which realistically favoured the 
employer's freedom of expression, to one which is built on addressing the inherently 
unbalanced bargaining powers. 
C Application of North American Principles 
I Guidelines which could be transferred to the ER Act 
In North America it is clearly not fatal for the employer to communicate with the 
employee, the espoused concern of employers towards the communication provisions. 162 
When communicating, they must be wary as to the timing, process and context of the 
communication and bargaining at hand. North American cases stress situations where 
bargaining is imminent or underway, as times when employers must proceed with 
caution. This may be exemplified with the involvement of the union , be it notification of 
the intended communication, direct prior consultation or concuITent involvement. The 
stronger the union presence, the more significant this involvement becomes. The ER Act 
demands this caution even more so, with more express and detailed statutory provisions 
focusing on preventing the bypassing of representatives. 
(a) Employee Involvement 
With regard to employee consultation, the United States and Canada arc more 
likely to experience difficulty in implementing such programmes due to their respective 
legislative provisions. Implementing a programme intricately related to bargaining 
160 Letter from RA Stockdill, Department of Labour to Walter Grills, Interim Good Faith Committee (20 
September 2000). 
161 John Hughes '"Good Faith' and Collective Bargaining under the Employment Relations Bill" (2000) 3 
ELB 45, 56. 
162 Robin Mackay (ed) Employment Lnw Guide (5ed, Butterworths, Wellington) 193, ER32. l l. 
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subjects without union involvement, in a unionised workplace is likely to be deemed bad 
faith, and also devalue the success of the programme. 163 Methods of successfully 
initiating these programmes include bringing the scheme to the bargaining table, 16.i 
demonstrating an intent to present all generated ideas to the union, 165 or at the minimum, 
notifying the union. Work consultation groups may not meet with such difficulty in New 
Zealand, yet this tentative guidance may be increasingly relevant if these schemes begin 
to be used with the ulterior motive of undermining or eliminating union presence. If this 
should this be the case, these guidelines may only be preaching to the converted, as 
employers with these motives will be unlikely to regard or adhere to any orth American 
good faith principles. 
Under the EC Act, Duval v Sky City Auckland Ltd166 distinguished meetings, 167 
from which the union was excluded, as consulting with staff over an operational policy, 
rather than negotiating contract variations. 168 Although this determination would now be 
subject to the ER Act's extended bargaining definition, such distinctions as to what 
constitutes bargaining are likely to play an increasing role in employee consultation 
scenarios. 
(b) Bargaining progress and final offer communications 
North American case law has tended towards conclusions that bargaining reports 
to employees are permissible in certain circumstance , such as when the union is 
informed. The ER Act's express provisions may cause a deviation from the path of North 
American principles. Section 32(l)(d) is clearly at least partially drafted with intent to 
alter New Zealand's stance on communications from the wide permissible base in Capital 
Coast Health and Ivamy. In this sense, it appears unlikely employers would be able to 
simultaneously present final offers to employees, if this would restrict the union's ability 
to explain and represent the employees. Bargaining progre s meetings such as those 
163 Joseph Ryan "The Encouragement of Labour-Management Co-operat ion : Improving American 
Productivity through Revision of the National Labour Relatio ns Act" ( 1992) 40 UCLA L Rev 571, 629. 
IMRyan,above,630. 
165 Permanente Medical Group Inc (2000) 332 NLRB No 106, 4. 
166 Duval v Sky City Auckland Ltd (1999] l ERNZ 15 (Emp Ct) Travis J. . . 
167 The meetings involved the staff request and petition for free meals during shifts. 
168 Duval v Sky City Auckland Ltd, above, 26 Travis J. 
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sometimes allowed in North America may be slightly more permissible, yet only in a 
restricted sense. Employers would need a legitimate reason, such as a demon strable claim 
that the union is severely misrcprc enting the progress, bad ra1th v\h1ch the employer 
might be trying to counter. As a whole, the ER Act 's statutory expressions regarding the 
undermining of authority offer a more limited view than has evolved in North America, 
hence North American case law should accordingly be viewed in a restricted sense. 
The ER Act will clearly restrict communications between employers and 
employees considerably more than the EC Act did. The inclusion of indirect 
communication within a wide interpretation of bargaining considerably nanows what is 
permissible. New Zealand's sections are drafted more stringently than the North 
American counterparts. This calls for employers to be circumspect as to the subject, 
manner and timing of any communications undertaken within the wide bargaining period. 
Ultimately the ER Act demands an increased respect for representatives. 
VIII EARLY IND/CIA OF NEW ZEALAND GOOD FAITH DEVELOPMENT 
The good faith obligation is clearly dependent on each factual scenario, and will 
develop in a case-by-case manner. In the first year of operation the ER Act has faced no 
strong challenge to the bargaining aspect of the good faith obligation . Early 
determinations may shed light on ew Zealand's approach to the wider good faith 
obligation. 
A 
I 
Employment Court and Authority Determinations 
169 Baguley v Coutts Cars 
Baguley was the first case of its kind to be heard by the Employment Court. 
Primarily an unjustified dismissal per onal grievance, Baguley ' claim was supplemented 
with an alleged breach of good faith. 170 The Court, in recognition of the precedent setting 
ability of the case carefully traversed the good faith sections, articulated the legislature's 
169 Bagu/ey v Couus Cars (3 April 2000) Employment Court Auckland AC 25/0 I , Judgment of the Court 
(Bagu/ey). 
170 
Baguley, above, 7 para 7. 
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emphasis on the relationship approach to employment, 17 1 and then noted this would 
require EC Act cases to be reconsidered.172 The Court found the employer had failed to 
fulfil their good faith obligation, yet awarded no damages for this breach. onetheless the 
Court was careful not to rule out the future possibility of awarding damages for a section 
4 breach. 173 
2 The Independent Newspapers Ltd casem 
This determination of the Authority involved a union claim that each of the 
respondent employers had not bargained in good fait h following the union initiation of 
multi-employer collective bargaining.175 The employers, each independent subsidiary 
branches of Independent Newspapers, had only bargained on the issue of whether there 
would be a multi-employer agreement. The Authority was asked whether failing to 
consider the union's substantive proposals for a multi-employer contract was a breach of 
good faith . The decision was observed to follow many of the procedural steps utilised in 
North America, such as using a subjective test and a totality approach to determine 
whether the intent to bargain in good faith existed. 176 Only one newspaper was found to 
have come to bargaining with a closed mind, 177 yet all regional newspapers were found to 
have not bargained in good faith by not meeting, considering or responding to the union 's 
proposals. Section 32(l)(b) and (c) compliance orders were then ordered by the 
Authority. 
Although this Authority determination does not directly address the issues of thi s 
paper, it does illustrate how section 32 requirements may be used to natTow a union 's 
171 
Baguley, above, 18 para 56. 
172 Bag uley, above 13, para 43. 
173 Bag 11 /ey, above, 20-2 1 paras 63-64, $ 15 750 in damages were awarded as compensation for the personal 
gr ieva nce claim. 
174 New Zealwid Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union ( Inc) v Independent 
Newspapers Ltd (3 August 2001) Employment Relations A uthority Wellington, W A5 l/Ol, GJ Wood 
( Independent Newspapers) 
175 The first respondent, Independent Newspapers Ltd, owns all of the other ten respondents, each 
independent reg ional newspapers. 
176 Independent Ne1vspapers, above, 16-2-+ GJ Wood. . 
177 This was the Manawatu Standard, whose General Manager clear ly stated 1n a letter to the union that he 
was not interested in a multi -employer contract, then did not sent a direct representat_ive to the bargaining 
sess ion, despite its proximity to their office , and was uninterested in the ou tcome of the session. 
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broad good faith claim.
178 
Independent Newspapers is also indicative of the ER Act's aim 
to intervene at a relatively early stage, in the hope that the pa11ies can solve the 
bargaining issues themselves, and build a more productive relationship. In supporting the 
features of this paper, the Authority expressed obiter recognising "that 'surface 
bargaining' would be in breach of New Zealand law," and North Ame1ican case law may 
also be appropriate to refer to in other cases. 179 
IX THE PATH AHEAD FOR GOOD FAITH BARGAINING 
Combining North American trends with the early ER Act interpretations, it may 
be predicted New Zealand authorities wi II tend to re] y on speci fie breaches of the ER Act, 
with general good faith claims dealt with as secondary, supportive claims. Where there is 
a breach of section 4, yet an absence of excessively bad faith behaviour, the Authority or 
Court may often find this breach in name only, with no direct remedy, as per Baguley. 180 
This approach does not entirely marginalise good faith, as it remains the concept that 
underpins the whole Act, with the specific requirements often enacted as a measure of 
achieving good faith. 181 This tendency does not exclude the undertaking of more drastic 
action where excessively bad faith behaviour is encountered. 
The two focal points of this paper, surface bargaining and communications 
between employers and employees are likely to grow through different paths under the 
ER Act. Surface bargaining has developed in orth America as a general good faith 
claim, focusing on the totality of conduct and subjective intent, and is not expressly 
addressed in the ER Act. Comparatively, communication offences have clearly been 
included, and are proven through the observance of objective behaviour. In this manner, 
a good faith claim which can rely on a specific section 32 breach will be the more certain 
approach, with a general claim, such as su1face bargaining operating as a more 
background element. 
178 For although the unions claims were against most of the employer's bargaining actions, breaches were 
only found in the above narrow areas. . 
179The decision here was arrived at without extensive reliance on North American case law. 
180 Especia ll y where there is specified remedies for the other breach, such as those specified in Part 9, for 
personal grievances. 
181 Particularly s 32, entitled 'Good faith for Collective Bargaining.' 
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As su1face bargaining is not expressly addressed in the ER Act, it may be 
hypothesised that New Zealand autho,ities will increasingly look to North American case 
law. The many years of United States and Canadian experience may therefore be highly 
influential in the development of an obligation in ew Zealand. 182 Alternatively, claims 
embraced within one of the requirements of section 32, and to a lesser degree the Code, 
may be more likely to develop independently of North American case law. Such 
provisions have the ability to refer to the section's wording, the drafter's intent, the 
purpose of the Act and especially in the case of communication, the New Zealand history 
pertaining to the action. Therefore, although connections to United States and Canadian 
developments can be observed in the legislation, they are less likely to receive in depth 
judicial contemplation. In terms of the substantive direction of the communication 
provisions, the ER Act's provi sions have emerged as more detailed than the principles 
developed in North America, which may be attributable to the previously wide employer 
rights. Early interpretations may therefore lean towards a comparatively stringent 
approach to communication during an extended bargaining period. 
The effectiveness of available remedies will be hi ghly influential in the practical 
implementation of good faith. This has emerged as a major barrier to effectively 
preventing employers from surface bargaining in North America. The eventual 
bargaining order poses no substitute for the damage to union status incutTed from delay. 
The remedy imposed must also be sufficient to overcome the cost an employer may be 
willing to pay to keep a union out of their agreement, be this through surface bargaining 
or direct communication with the intent to undermine the union. The willingness of the 
Court to follow through with the provided penalties for breaches of compliance orders 
will be instrumental to this development. 
X CONCLUSION 
The true nature of New Zealand's good faith bargaining obligation remains to be 
exposed. Unions and employers alike remain uncertain as most sections wait to come 
35 
under the scrutiny of the specialist institutions . The approaches of the Court of Appeal 
may be even more anticipated, due to its notoriety under the EC Act for diminishing 
~ loyee's rights. The collective relationship duties have been defined somewhat more 
specifically than both those required in individual agreements and foreign collective 
relationships. In this sense, the minimum requirements outlined may be read as a 
relatively stem warning as to what action must be avoided, particularly with reference to 
communication during bargaining. General claims, in many circumstances may stand 
meekly behind these provisions, yet be of an unknown quantity should they stand alone. 
In this context, the influence of the United States and Canada is clear in the drafting of a 
relatively specific good faith obligation. Although clearly a source of legislative 
guidance, in many cases it appears likely th at such guidance will pl ay onl y a limited rule 
in subsequent judicial interpretation . 
182 This may also be applicable to the in fo rmati on provisions, w_h1ch while bei ng a new statutory obliga lion 
in New Zealand, are well established principles in North America. 
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